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Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their com- 
pany. . . I want, through targeted reform, to reward long term 
commitment by employees. I want to encourage the new enter- 
prise culture of team work in which everyone contributes and 
everyone benefits from success. 
-U.K.  Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury 1999) 
3.1  Background and Motivation 
Many analysts and decision makers in industry, labor, and government 
believe that the traditional wage-employment relationship is not appro- 
priate for a modern competitive economy. In place of the historic capital- 
labor dichotomy in which employers pay a fixed wage for the right to tell 
employees what to do, a new system of work arrangements has developed 
in which employees share in the financial fortunes of the firm and make 
many of the decisions that determine firm performance. This shared capi- 
talist model of work and compensation (Freeman 1999) dominates new in- 
formation technology firms in the United States, but it is found in other 
sectors and countries as well. 
For  over two decades, the United Kingdom has tried to encourage 
shared capitalist practices by offering tax advantages to firms that link pay 
to profits, provide company shares to workers, encourage workers to save 
through stock options, or develop approved share-option plans. In 1999, 
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the U.K. government issued draft legislation introducing two new plans: 
the All Employee Share Plan, through which employees will be able to buy 
“partnership” shares in their firm out of their pretax and pre-National  In- 
surance contribution salary, and Enterprise Management Incentives in- 
tended to help smaller companies with the potential for growth to recruit 
and retain  high-caliber employees by  giving tax advantages to options 
granted to a small number of employees.’ By contrast,  the government has 
moved to eliminate tax advantages for profit-related pay, based on the no- 
tion that many firms used this to get tax advantages without really linking 
pay to profits. The 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey shows 
that 86 percent of the establishments that had profit-related pay were tak- 
ing advantage of the tax break. 
Behind the desire to increase shared compensation in the United King- 
dom is the widespread belief, expressed by the Chancellor of the Exche- 
quer, that shared capitalist arrangements will create a better work culture 
with improved productivity and commitment by employees. Existing stud- 
ies on profit  sharing, employee ownership, and employee participation 
lend  general  support to this  proposition  (Weitzman and Kruse  1990; 
OECD 1995; Doucouliagos 1995), but these studies also show consider- 
able variability in the effects of practices on firm performance. In addition, 
the economic context in which the programs operate (e.g., whether infor- 
mation sharing takes place) and the details of the schemes seem to affect 
their success rate. 
Our goals address the following two questions. How far has the United 
Kingdom moved  from  standard wage-employment  contracts  toward  a 
shared mode of compensation? What effect has shared compensation had 
on economic outcomes? 
This paper examines these questions using a 1999 survey of the shared 
compensation strategies used by  a sample of U.K. listed companies be- 
tween 1995 and 1998; the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) of some 2,000 U.K. establishments or  workplaces; and the 1990- 
1998 longitudinal WERS panel survey of nearly 900 workplaces. We use 
these data to describe the growth and use of shared capitalist compensa- 
tion practices and to assess the effects of these practices on productivity 
and related economic outcomes. We have three findings: 
1. Shared-compensation practices are substantial and growing in the 
United Kingdom largely in response to Treasury policies designed to en- 
courage them. Upwards of half of U.K. workplaces have some form of 
shared-compensation program and over one-third have something beyond 
profit-related pay (which the government abolished as of 2000). About half 
1. The government  introduced  further new legislation  in 2001  (see  http://www.inland 
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of the listed firms in our firm-based data also have some form of shared 
compensation. 
2.  Firms and establishments with shared compensation,  particularly 
those with deferred profit sharing and employee share ownership, are  more 
likely to establish formal communication and consultation channels with 
workers than other establishments. 
3.  Firms and establishments that use shared compensation tend to out- 
perform other firms and establishments in productivity and financial per- 
formance. Moreover, the stock price of firms with shared-compensation 
practices has also performed better than those of other firms. But combin- 
ing shared compensation and information or communication systems does 
not add extra productivity impact. 
Overall, our findings are quite similar across firm and establishment data 
sets in that they tell a favorable story about shared-compensation modes of 
pay, including the share ownership schemes that have become a U.K. gov- 
ernment priority. The one area where our two data sources tell a different 
story is the area of profit-related pay: Our firm analysis finds that profit- 
related pay has no effect on productivity, while our establishment data finds 
an effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 deals 
with shared-compensation policies and practices in the United Kingdom. 
Section 3.3 asks how shared compensation  arrangements should affect 
firm performance. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide the main evidence. Section 
3.4 deals with the firm-level evidence using the company survey, and sec- 
tion 3.5 uses the WERS data. Finally, in section 3.6 we offer some conclud- 
ing remarks. 
3.2  Shared Compensation Policies and Practices in the United Kingdom 
As noted, the United Kingdom has experimented with a rich variety of 
policies to encourage shared compensation. The following subsection pro- 
vides a capsule summary of policies dating from the late 1970s to 2000 and 
is divided between schemes designed for all employees and schemes de- 
signed for top management and other special workers. 
3.2.1  U.K. Programs to Encourage Shared Capitalism; 
All Employee Schemes 
Approved Projit-Related Puy 
In 1987,  the scheme was introduced for employers to pay a profit-related 
compensation package. Initially, tax relief was given on half of the profit- 
related payments up to a limit of the lower of E3,OOO or 20 percent of the 
employee’s pay. The cash limit was increased to E4,OOO  in 1989.  In 199  1, the 112  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
tax relief was increased to the whole of the payment. In the Finance Act of 
1997, the income tax relief was set to be phased out over a three- to four- 
year period. For profit periods beginning in 1998 the cash ceiling was re- 
duced to &2,000,  and for periods beginning in 1999 the ceiling was reduced 
to &1,000.  As of January 2000, this scheme was no longer running. 
Approved Projit-Sharing Scheme 
The approved profit-sharing scheme is a vehicle for companies to provide 
free shares to employees that are free from tax liabilities. Profit-sharing 
schemes were introduced in the 1978 Finance Act. In 2000, there were about 
950 approved profit-sharing schemes in operation with an estimated cost to 
the government in tax relief ofEl50  million. Profit-sharing schemes must be 
open to any employee who has been employed by the company for more 
than five years. There are about 1.25 million participants covered under 
these arrangements (data taken from http://www.proshare.org). However, 
the approved profit-sharing scheme is being phased out with the introduc- 
tion of the new all-employee plan (see http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk). 
New All Employee Share Plan (2000) 
This plan stipulates that firms can give free shares tax free; employees 
buy shares out of pretax income, and firms can match employee purchases. 
Employees who leave the firm must withdraw shares. The firm has a flex- 
ible performance criterion for tax relief: Employees who keep shares in the 
employee share ownership plan trust for five years pay no income tax and 
pay capital gains only on an increase in value. Companies get relief for 
costs of providing shares for employees. 
Approved Save as You Earn Scheme 
The SAYE scheme, or savings-related option scheme, is an arrangement 
such that an employee has the right to buy shares at a future date at a pre- 
specified purchase price. The company grants employees the option to buy 
the company’s shares in three, five, or seven years’ time. Either the price is 
the current market price or the option can be issued at a discount of up to 
20 percent of that price. The scheme has to be open to all employees of the 
company  with  more  than five  years  of  service  (see http://www.inland 
revenue.gov.uk). There are currently over 1,200 SAYE schemes in opera- 
tion, with an estimated cost to the government in tax relief of E600 million. 
There are about 1.75 million participants covered under these arrange- 
ments (see http://www.proshare.org). 
Management and Special-Employee Schemes; 
Approved Company Share Option Plan 
The approved company share option plan (CSOP) is a scheme under 
which an employee has the right to purchase a fixed number of shares at a 
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may not be offered at a discount. The employee does not pay income tax on 
the grant of the option or any increase in the market value of shares before 
the option is exercised. Unlike SAYE schemes, discretion is given to the 
company as to which employees are eligible and are granted options. They 
tend to be granted to company directors. There are currently over 3,750 
such approved CSOPs in operation, with an estimated cost to the govern- 
ment in tax relief of El30 million. There are about 450,000 participants 
covered under these arrangements (see http://www.proshare.org). 
The most widely used system was profit-related pay, which gave income 
tax relief to workers for compensation related to profits. Profit-related pay 
schemes were widely adopted after the 1987 introduction of the tax break 
to the extent that by 1998 32 percent of British workplaces and 37 percent 
of workers were receiving part of their pay for profit-related reasons. How- 
ever, the Treasury came to view the system as overly open to scam behav- 
ior because firms found ways to classify any sort of pay as profit related in 
order to take advantage of the tax break. It began phasing out the program 
in 1997.  As of 2000, profit-related pay was history in the United Kingdom. 
The U.K. government has programs that encourage firms to pay work- 
ers in shares or stock options or that encourage employees to invest in 
shares. One important U.K. plan is the Save as You Earn (SAYE) share op- 
tion scheme, which gives tax relief to workers who enter a savings contract 
that puts money into an account to buy the shares when the period ends. 
The 1978 Finance Act introduced approved profit-sharing schemes as a ve- 
hicle for companies to provide free shares to employees that carry no tax li- 
abilities. This plan is being phased out and replaced by the All Employee 
Share Plan, which allows firms to give free shares to workers without tax li- 
ability and also gives tax breaks to employees who buy shares that they 
hold for five years (with smaller tax breaks to workers who hold them for 
three years). 
In addition to these schemes, the United Kingdom gives tax advantages 
to shared-compensation plans that go largely to top management. Com- 
pany share option plans allow employees to purchase shares at a predeter- 
mined price at some future date, without paying income tax on the grant or 
on any increase in the market value of shares. In 2000, the government in- 
troduced an Enterprise Market Incentive option program to help smaller 
companies with potential for growth to recruit and to retain high-caliber 
employees. 
3.2.2  Data on Shared Compensation in the United Kingdom 
Our information on shared-compensation practices in the United King- 
dom comes from two bodies of data: the WERS and a special survey of 
listed firms  that  Martin Conyon  and Laura Read  conducted  in  1999 
(Conyon and Read 2000). From the WERS, we use the 1998 cross-sectional 
survey, which contains information  on compensation and employment 
practices at 2,191 workplaces in Britain with ten or more employees, and 114  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
the 1990-1998 WERS panel survey, which contains information on 882 
surviving workplaces from the 1990 survey. The WERS surveys have ex- 
tremely high response rates-80  percent for the 1998 cross section and 86 
percent for the 1990-1998 longitudinal survey*-which  make them partic- 
ularly valuable for obtaining an accurate picture of shared-compensation 
practices at British workplaces. But the WERS is not perfect for our anal- 
ysis. It has only categorical measures of establishment outcomes (whether 
productivity and financial performance are a lot above, somewhat above, 
or below average in a sector) and little information about the company as 
a whole. To  obtain better data on firm-level compensation strategy and 
performance, we rely on the Conyon and Read 1999 survey of U.K. firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange.'  This survey contains 299 com- 
pleted usable responses from a sample of 1,5  18, giving a response rate of 20 
percent, which is good for surveys of this type. The sample is generally rep- 
resentative of the sampled p~pulation.~  Because these are listed compa- 
nies, we can measure actual value added and related variables as well as 
track share prices, which we cannot do with the WERS data. By  combin- 
ing information  from the two sources, we  provide more robust results 
about the effects of shared compensation than would otherwise be the case. 
Table 3.1 contains statistics on shared-compensation practices in  1998 
from the WERS and WERS panel surveys. The top section gives the per- 
centage  of  firms  with  the  specified  compensation  practice  in  1998, 
weighted by the sample weightss It shows that the most popular form of 
2. Interviews were conducted with a manager in each workplace, and 950 worker represen- 
tatives were also interviewed, representing 82 percent of cases in which an eligible represen- 
tative  was  identified.  Completed questionnaires  wcre  obtained from 28,323 employees, 
around two-thirds of those distributed. 
3. Investment trusts were excluded from the sampling frame. A polential population of 
1,505 companies was effectively identified on 11 April 1999. The survey questionnaire was 
sent to the human resources director or company secrctary at each firm. Where possible, the 
individual human resources director was identified by name and the survey was personally 
addressed to him or her. We administered the survey as  follows. There were three waves to the 
survey: The first was a fax survey, the second was a postal survey, and the third was another 
fax survey. The number of firms completing the survey in each wave was 157, 80. and 62, re- 
spectively. In addition, another 52 companies in total responded but declined to take part in 
the survey. The  reasons for not completing the survey included (1) it was company policy not 
to complete surveys; (2) they do not hold relevant statistics; (3) they were too busy; and (4) 
the survey was not applicable to that company. 
4. The procedure involved estimating a standard probit model in which the outcome vari- 
able was equal to 1 if the company was in the sample and 0 otherwise. The right-hand-side 
variables were log of market value, log ofemployment, log of capital, and ten sector dummies. 
The null hypothesis of no differences between the sample and nonsample firms in terms of 
these characteristics was tested. This would be confirmed by  nonsignificant coefficients on 
each of the right-hand-side variables. In the event, it was found that companies with a high 
market value were about 4 percent more likely to respond and that companies  with more em- 
ployees were about 4 percent less likely to respond. Other control variables (capital intensity 
variable and sector dummies) were not significant. 
5. Weighting by the establishrncnt weights is very important for obtaining nationwide rep- 
resentative figures because of the WERS sampling design. Unweighted figures show much 
higher proportions with shared-capitalist forms of pay because the sample has dispropor- 
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Table 3.1  Percentages of Employees with Shared Compensation in British 
Establishments, 1998 (%) 
No. of  Employees 
Establishments  Sum 
Any employees eligible for variable 
pay scheme” 
Profit-related payments or bonuses 
Deferred profit-sharing schemes 
Employee share ownership schemes 
Other cash bonus schemes 
Any variable pay scheme 






variable pay schemea 
Profit-related payments or bonuses  27.9 
Employee share ownership schemes  12.9 
Any group performance-related schemes  11.5 
Profit-related payments or bonuses  41.1 
Deferred profit-sharing schemes  7.8 
SAYE share options  30.0 
Discretionary or executive share 
ownership schemes  20.8 
All employeesh 
Nonexecutive employee share ownership  7.9 
Source: 1998 WERS, WERS Panel 1990-1998. 
aWERS  1998, weighted. 














shared compensation was profit-related pay or bonuses, the vast majority 
of which were part of the approved Inland Revenue scheme. The second 
most important form of shared compensation was “other cash bonus” 
schemes. This was followed by employee share ownership schemes, cover- 
ing  14.6 percent of workplaces  and 22 percent of employees. Deferred 
profit-sharing schemes were the least frequently used form of shared com- 
pensation. The second section of table 3.1 gives figures for nonmanagerial 
workers. For the plans on which we have data for all workers and nonman- 
agerial workers, the percentages covered are modestly lower for the latter, 
indicating that the bulk of these plans are offered to the majority of the 
workforce. In fact, questions in the WERS on the proportion of covered 
nonmanagerial  workers  show a  bimodal  distribution, with  most  firms 
offering plans to 90 percent to 100 percent of the work force or to no one 
at all. Finally, 11.5 percent of establishments and 17.3 percent of workers 
have some form of group performance-related pay. 
The bottom section of table 3.1 shows the pattern of shared compensa- 
tion in the longitudinal WERS file in 1998. The questions on shared com- 
pensation in the longitudinal file relate specifically to the legal schemes and 
thus give a more precise link to the policies in subsection 3.2.1. We report 
the figures here without taking account of the sample weights because our 116  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
ensuing analysis focuses on each establishment as an independent obser- 
vation, and the weights have less meaning given what ultimately turns out 
to be a relatively small sample of establishments that change their shared- 
compensation strategy. These data show that about 40 percent of estab- 
lishments were covered by profit-related pay, about 30 percent covered by 
SAYE share options, 21  percent  by  discretionary  or executive option 
schemes, and about 8 percent by deferred profit sharing or other share 
ownership schemes. 
Turning to our firm-based survey, table 3.2 gives the prevalence of prac- 
tices across the sample of listed firms for all employees and for managerial 
and nonmanagerial employees taken separately from 1995 to 1998. Con- 
sistent with  the establishment  results,  the data show that firms in  the 
sample increased their  use of Inland  Revenue-approved  compensation 
practices over this period. For instance, 3  1.1 percent of firms report that 
use of SAYE schemes in 1995 increased to 45.8 percent in 1998; the 18.8 
percent who used the (now defunct) approved profit-related pay schemes 
in 1995  increased to 25.1 percent in 1998; and so on. But the data also show 
increases in the use of nonapproved schemes. The proportion of firms with 
discretionary option schemes, which are directed at selected employees 
(such as directors), doubled over the period 1995-1998 from 22.9 percent 
to 42.8 percent. U.K. firms rarely use companywide bonus schemes related 
to improvements in productivity. Finally, conditional on having a partic- 
ular scheme, the data also show that companies are more likely to use 
shared-compensation practices for managerial employees than for non- 
managerial employees, with one exception: the approved profit-related pay 
schemes (which were phased out as of the year 2000). 
3.3  How Should Shared Compensation Affect Firm Performance? 
3.3.1  Agency Considerations 
In principle, shared compensation should motivate workers to work 
harder and to make decisions that are favorable to the firm, thereby im- 
proving  corporate performance  and ultimately  the  present  discounted 
value of the enterprise. Shared compensation helps resolve the moral haz- 
ard problem between the owner of the firm and the employee when effort 
levels of the employee are not perfectly observed or verified. An optimal 
second-best shared-compensation contract motivates the employee to fo- 
cus upon what the owner cares about while recognizing the trade-off be- 
tween risk and incentives. 
Agency theory predicts that the extent of shared compensation will de- 
pend on the characteristics of employees and the firm. The less risk-averse 
the employee, the higher is the optimal sharing rate between the owner and 
the employee, because the employee is more willing to bear the relevant Table 3.2  Compensation Strategies in Firm-Based Data Set (“h) 
Percent of Firms  Percent of Management  Percent of Nonmanagement 
with Specified Strategy  Employees with Specified Strategy  Employees with Specified Strategy 
Compensation Strategy  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Approved profit-sharing scheme  18.9  19.0  22.0  25.1 
Other share-based profit-sharing scheme  4.3  5.9  8.8  10.4 
Cash-based profit-sharing scheme  13.6  14.5  15.9  17.1 
Approved profit-related pay scheme  27.6  34.7  38.1  36.9 
Approved SAYE share option scheme  31.1  35.6  43.7  45.8 
Other all-employee share option scheme  6.1  9.3  11.5  12.4 
Approved company share option plan  41.2  45.8  54.6  56.6 
Other discretionary share option scheme  22.9  31.1  40.7  42.8 
Source: Based on a sample of 299 U.K. stock market firms surveyed in 1999. 




























































48.  I 
16.5 
9.9 
1997  1998 
62.7  65.1 
21.8  17.7 
47.4  45.5 
88.1  86.5 
53.4  58.1 
47.4  49.4 
50.4  50.8 
18.7  18.6 
11.5  10.8 
Nofes;  Actual numbers of firms per cell may differ. The results in Management and Nonmanagement columns are conditional upon the firm’s having the partic- 
ular compensation strategy. 
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risk. Similarly, the less effort-averse the employee, the higher is the optimal 
sharing rate, since that employee will be more willing to put out the requi- 
site effort. On the firm’s side, the greater the likely impact of effort on 
profits, the bigger is the incentive to link employee income to performance. 
In addition, the more accurate the firm’s signal of employee effort and ac- 
tivity, the higher is the optimal sharing rate. The firm should share more re- 
wards when it is more certain that output results come from employee ac- 
tivity rather than from some exogenous factor. At the same time, the firm 
should not be able to monitor perfectly the effort or activity of the worker, 
for if management could do that, it would not need an incentive contract 
in the first place to induce appropriate employee actions. 
This analysis has several implications for understanding shared capital- 
ist arrangements. First, in general we would expect that, in the absence of 
the free-rider problems that are discussed later, shared-compensation sys- 
tems are associated  with improved performance.  However, the analysis 
also suggests that firms with shared-compensation  practices are likely to 
draw upon workers with different characteristics than those that choose 
other firms-workers  with  less  risk  aversion  and  less  disutility  from 
work-and  will also themselves have different characteristics from other 
firms. This creates a problem in inferring causal relations from regressions 
based on cross-sectional comparisons. Our response is to rely largely on 
fixed effects models that contrast a firm before and after introduction  of 
shared-compensation practices. This is not perfect, since the introduction 
of new shared arrangements is itself endogenous, but it does give an accu- 
rate picture of performance of the same firm or workplace under different 
conditions. 
3.3.2  Decentralization of Decision-Making Rights 
Second, the analysis suggests that shared compensation  should be ac- 
companied by shared decision making. The process of transforming inputs 
into outputs in capitalist firms increasingly relies on the performance of 
multiple tasks by employees. These tasks are bundled into  jobs that vary by 
the number of tasks performed by the employee as well as the decision- 
making authority assigned to the worker. The trend in the 1990s has been 
toward jobs that have a wider variety of tasks and that allow employees to 
make more decisions. The benefits to the firm of decentralizing decision- 
making authority will depend on factors such as worker-specific  (local- 
ized) knowledge in the performance of the tasks, the conservation of man- 
agement time, and more effective motivation of workers. It pays the firm to 
give incentives to workers only when workers have discretion to vary what 
they do  at workplaces, and it pays management to devolve decisions to em- 
ployees only when employees have incentives to  make decisions that raise 
the value of the firm. We examine this linkage in our empirical work. 
Third, there are potentially important costs to decentralizing decision- Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  119 
making rights. These include agency costs, coordination costs, and the in- 
efficient use of central information by local decision makers. There are also 
important questions about the potential efficiency effects of all-employee 
stock option plans and other schemes that link worker pay to measures of 
aggregate company performance rather than to group or workplace per- 
formance. Chief executive officers (CEOs) and other top executives can 
affect share prices, so that options or share ownership can help resolve the 
principal-agent problem for them (see Conyon and Murphy 2000). But em- 
ployees lower in the firm’s hierarchy have little direct effect on the company 
stock price. They lack a clear “line of  sight” to link their decisions to the 
share prices and company profit levels that would affect their pay. As a re- 
sult, we would expect firms to use more narrowly defined performance tar- 
gets-establishment,  group, or workplace-related incentive pay systems- 
for these workers, and that those forms of shared compensation would be 
more effective in motivating workers than programs that link pay to more 
aggregate measures. 
Core and Guay (2001), using U.S. data, show that the provision options 
to all employees are consistent with incentive theory. Firms with more 
monitoring costs, greater growth opportunities, and employees who have 
greater marginal products allocate greater amounts of option incentives to 
all employees. 
3.3.3  The Free-Rider Problem 
The classic problem with any group performance-related  pay scheme is 
the free-rider problem (also known as the “l/Nproblem,”  where Nis the to- 
tal number of employees in the team or group). In most work situations, 
employees perform  tasks that involve productive interactions with col- 
leagues in which total output reflects the contribution of many individuals. 
Team production suggests that individual contribution to output cannot 
be easily identified and that compensation must be based on some aggre- 
gate measure of output, such as team or division output. But in such set- 
tings there is a potentially weak connection between individual effort and 
reward. If rewards are shared equally on the basis of team production (and 
rewards cannot exceed the revenues of the group), then each individual has 
the incentive to shirk because he or she will gain only 1/N of the combined 
gains from increased effort (Kruse 1993; Blasi, Conte, and Kruse 1996; 
Kandel and Lazear 1992). Each employee hopes that his or her colleague 
will put forth the effort to increase output so that he or she will not have to 
do so and  will benefit from increased productivity without bearing the costs. 
A number of potential solutions have been suggested to overcome the 
free-rider problem. One solution is for workers to self-monitor or act as de 
facto monitors themselves. Another is for firms to invest in policies that 
promote team culture and employee participation in which group incen- 
tives provide a substitute for monitoring through peer pressure. This hori- 120  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
zontal monitoring may help resolve the free-rider problem (Kandel and 
Lazear 1992; Lazear 1995). It is possible that firms that use all-employee 
stock options or other ownership schemes do  so to help create a culture of 
teamwork  and cooperative company spirit that overrides the free-rider 
problem. 
3.3.4  Extant Evidence for the United Kingdom 
There is considerable evidence on the relationship between employee 
ownership or profit sharing and corporate performance, but less on the re- 
lationship between all-employee stock options and performance or be- 
tween individual ownership of shares, which U.K. legislation favors, and 
performance. The majority of the studies are of U.S. origin, but there have 
been some notable British studies and important studies in other countries 
as well. The first important analysis was the U.S. General Accounting Of- 
fice study in 1987, which found that ESOPs had an inconclusive impact on 
outcomes. Since then, research findings have been more positive, so that a 
general summary is moderately favorable to shared compensation. The 
strongest results are for profit sharing (Kruse 1993; Doucouliagos 1995), 
whereas those for employee ownership are more problematic. Kruse and 
Blasi (1 995) report on ten studies of US. ESOPs that have compared before- 
and-after implementation productivity effects using large databases. The 
majority of studies yield positive, but often insignificant, estimated effects 
of ESOP adoption on output. 
We briefly summarize extant U.K. studies. In the 1980s, analysts looked 
at the impact of profit sharing and employee ownership through coopera- 
tives on firm performance. Using the Workplace Industrial Relations Sur- 
vey (WIRS), the predecessor to the WERS survey, Blanchflower and Os- 
wald (1988) found no relationship between financial performance or the 
quality of industrial relations and measures of shared compensation (i.e., 
the existence of share ownership, a stock option plan, profit sharing, or 
bonus schemes). In a sample of about 100 U.K. companies between 1974 
and  1982, Wadhwani and Wall (1990) found weak  evidence that profit 
sharing boosted productivity. Cable and Wilson (1989) found a positive 
significant productivity effect for profit sharing in a sample of fifty-two 
British engineering firms; they also found that quality circles, briefing 
groups, or job rotation had a positive effect on productivity as well, and 
that having both profit sharing and employee involvement added most to 
productivity. 
Studies in the 1990s have added to the general picture of a modest posi- 
tive effect of shared compensation on outcomes. Estrin et al. (1 997) report 
a productivity  improvement  of about 6 percent  in  cases where  profit- 
sharing bonuses were of the order 5 percent to 10 percent of market wages. 
Robinson (1998) found that the SAYE scheme was associated with a pro- 
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forms of employee participation also raised productivity. McNabb and 
Whitfield (1998) used establishment data from WIRS and found that finan- 
cial participation is positively related to financial performance, as is profit- 
related pay. 
In short, the extant U.K.  evidence paints a picture much like that in the 
U.S. studies: Profit sharing has larger effects than ownership on productiv- 
ity, but neither is overwhelmingly powerful across studies. 
3.4  Production Function Evidence: Firm-Level Results 
We begin with our firm-based production function analysis. Appendix 
table 3A.1 shows the main characteristics of the data in our sample in ad- 
dition to the shared-compensation  characteristics previously  shown in 
table 3.2. We have information on sales, employment, and capital that al- 
lows us to estimate production functions for 284 companies between 1995 
and 1998. Trade union presence is constant across time at around 23 per- 
cent. Our measure of product market competition, the number of firms re- 
porting more than five competitors, increased from 72 percent of firms in 
1995 to 77 percent in 1999. Our measure of information sharing shows a 
more marked increase from 43 percent in 1995 to 61 percent in 1998. How- 
ever, firms are much less likely to have a joint committee of managers and 
employees for the purposes of consultation. 
To assess the productivity effects of different Inland Revenue-approved 
shared-compensation systems on firm-level performance, we used a Cobb- 
Douglas production function of the following form: 
Log(Q,,) = a,  + Pi ln(LJ  + P,  WK,J + P,(UnionJ  + P,(CompetitionJ 
+ P,(Share CompensationK,,) + p,(Year Dummies) + el/, 
where Q is real sales (Datastream item 104), L is total employment (Data- 
stream item 219), Kis an  estimate of the current real capital stock (based on 
an accrual method), Union is a time-varying measure of trade union pres- 
ence (available from the Conyon and Read [2000] survey data), and Com- 
petition is product market competition measure (a dummy variable = 1 if 
there are more than five competitors; available from the Conyon and Read 
[2000] survey data). 
The key explanatory variables are the measures of shared compensation. 
They are dummy variables for (1) approved profit-sharing scheme, (2) ap- 
proved profit-related pay scheme, (3)  approved all-employee share scheme, 
and (4) approved company share option scheme. 
The az  terms are the company fixed effects. By  including them we elimi- 
nate time-invariant firm factors, such as short-run managerial ability, risk, 
and so forth. But a fixed effects model does not resolve all problems with 
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The endogeneity issue is straightforward: Employees in highly profitable 
firms may demand some form of their pay in the form of shared compen- 
sation. However, in the absence of suitable instruments (as in Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1988, 724), we estimated a single equation with fixed effects. 
The key  dynamic issue relates to the timing of the shared-compensation 
practices. Ideally, we would have lagged the compensation practice vari- 
ables to see whether the introduction of a scheme was subsequently associ- 
ated with increased productivity or if costs of adjustment delayed its ben- 
efits, but the short time series precluded this strategy. 
Table 3.3 contains our principal  results  on the relationship between 
firm-level productivity and shared modes of compensation. Columns ( 1) 
through (4) enter each of the schemes separately into the productivity 
equation, with year and firm dummies to control for the fixed effects of 
these variables. Column (5)  enters each of the four schemes jointly. Finally, 
column (6) replaces the firm dummy variables with industry dummy vari- 
ables, which changes the model from a fixed effects to a cross-sectional 
analysis. The estimated coefficients on the shared-compensation variables 
show a significant positive correlation between firm productivity and two 
of  the Inland  Revenue-approved  schemes: the approved  profit-sharing 
scheme and the company share option plan. In contrast, we  find no evi- 
dence of a relationship between productivity  and the approved profit- 
related pay scheme (no longer in operation as of 2000) or between produc- 
tivity and the approved all-employee share option scheme. Column (6) 
shows that, absent the firm dummy variables, all the proxies for the shared 
capitalism and compensation variables are positive and significant. The 
difference between the results in columns (5) and (6) show that the cross- 
sectional relation between the approved profit-related pay scheme and the 
SAYE scheme and productivity is attributable to the unobserved charac- 
teristics of firm, whereas the relation between the approved profit-sharing 
scheme and the approved company share option scheme and productivity 
results from the actual adoption of those programs by particular firms. 
The coefficient estimates imply large-seemingly  implausibly large- 
productivity effects. For instance, from column (5), the point estimate on 
the approved profit-sharing scheme (0.173) implies an increase in produc- 
tivity of 18.9  percent.(j Similarly, the productivity effect associated with the 
approved company share option plan (coefficient estimate 0.121) is  12.2 
per~ent.~  Because of the UNproblem, we expected the observed effects of 
the shared-compensation  variables to have modest positive impacts on 
productivity, rather than such huge effects.*  Various reasons may account 
6.  Calculated as (e"1733  -  1) X  100. 
7. Calculated as (e1)1213  ~  1) X  100. 
8. Lazear (2000) found large productivity effects in an econometric case study of the Safe- 
lite Glass Company. Moving from hourly wages to a piece-rate regime was associated with a 
44 percent increase in productivity. This could be decomposed into an incentive effect (about 
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Table 3.3  Firm-Level Productivity Regressions: The Impact of Shared Modes of 










share option scheme 
SAYE 
share option scheme 
Approved company 
No. of observations 
Firms 
Year dummies 




0.6990***  0.6997***  0.7018*** 
(0.0885)  (0.0867)  (0.0888) 
0.1707***  0.1690***  0.1690*** 
(0.0400)  (0.0398)  (0.0397) 
-0.0444  -0.0318  -0.0279 
(0.0502)  (0.0460)  (0.0456) 
-0.1244  -0.1667  -0.1624 





-0.0  142 
(0.0396) 
942  938  942 
284  283  284 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
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No  No  No 
1995-1998  1995-1998  1995-1998 
0.9826  0.9824  0.9824 
0.7018***  0.6990*** 
(0.0866)  (0.0855) 
0.1833***  0.1870*** 
(0.0471)  (0.0479) 
-0.0282  -0.0593 
(0.0441)  (0.0529) 






-0.0061  0.0337 
-0.0292 
0.1314***  0.1213*** 
(0.0578)  (0.0594) 
936  932 
283  282 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
No  No 
1995-1998  1995-1998 
























Notes: Dependent variable in each column is log of total output. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. All regressions contain an unreported arbitrary constant. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
for our high estimates. The firms that introduced these schemes may have 
simultaneously introduced  other  high-performance  management  prac- 
tices that also contributed to prod~ctivity.~  Without any measure of these 
other changes, our regression attributes the improvement in productivity 
solely to the compensation scheme rather than to the full set of changed 
practices. 
We investigated our basic findings further by lagging the compensation 
scheme variables to see if there was any evidence of lagged effects in the link 
between having a shared capitalism arrangement and productivity. Lag- 
ging the shared-compensation variables by one period altered our results 
modestly. Reestimating the models in table 3.3, columns (1) through (5), 
9. There is a range of estimates of the relationship between shared capitalism or profit- 
sharing arrangements and productivity that average around modest positive values. Our re- 
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with the four compensation variables lagged one period produced the fol- 
lowing estimates. The coefficient (standard error) on the approved profit- 
sharing scheme was 0.060 (0.083); on the  approved  profit-related pay 
scheme, it was -0.015 (0.066); and on the approved all-employee share op- 
tion scheme (SAYE) it was significantly negative, -0.104 (0.058). However, 
on the approved company share option scheme, the estimate (standard er- 
ror) was positive 0.096 (0.057) and significant at the 10 percent level. This 
suggests that the results in table 3.3 are sensitive to the specification of tim- 
ing, which itself suggests that the firms introduced other changes as well. 
In sum, the firm-level results suggest that productivity is positively related 
to shared capitalism arrangements, but they do not conclusively establish 
that relation. For that, we would have to vary the compensation schemes 
(and other accompanying changes in labor practices) through an experi- 
mental design. 
This said, we note that the differential effect of the alternative shared- 
compensation systems reported in table 3.3 broadly fits with our earlier 
discussion. Approved company share option schemes cover selected em- 
ployees, typically directors, who can affect company performance in re- 
sponse to stock option incentives. The impact of the profit-sharing scheme 
is more difficult to account for: On the one hand, it is based on profits, 
which are more susceptible to employee effort than share prices, but the re- 
ward is shares, which are more risky than cash or profit-related bonuses 
would be. Since the new all-employee partnership share system is a close 
lineal descendent of the approved profit-sharing scheme, the results sug- 
gest that the new program will have positive effects. Finally, the negligible 
coefficient on the profit-related pay scheme (consistent with Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1988)  indicates that the decision to terminate this program will 
have no  adverse productivity effects (although it will hurt employee-owned 
firms that have used the program-such  as John Lewis, among others-at 
least until they find substitute ways to reward staff). 
Further experiments were carried out to test the robustness of our firm- 
level findings. We  imposed constant returns to scale on the production 
function. The overall results remained  unchanged. For example, the re- 
estimated full model contained in table 3.3, column (5), yielded labor and 
capital coefficients of 0.789 and 0.21 1, respectively. The qualitative effects 
of the shared-compensation indicator variables remained unaltered. The 
approved profit-related  pay and SAYE dummies were insignificant. The 
point  estimate  (robust  standard error) on the approved  profit-sharing 
scheme was 0.176 (0.075), and for the approved company share option plan 
it was 0.106 (0.064). Both variables are significant, although the estimate 
on the company share option plan falls slightly. 
Our firm-based survey also gathered data on whether or not the firm 
shared information with employees, consulted with employees, or commu- 
nicated with them extensively. We use these data to develop an  information- 
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we  added this variable to the equation and interacted it with the shared- 
compensation  variables.'O A  positive  interaction  term  indicates that  a 
shared-compensation system is more effective in environments where in- 
formation,  consultation,  and  communication  between  employees  and 
managers are also found. The results of this analysis (given in table 3A.2) 
indicate that information sharing is not associated with higher productiv- 
ity, conditional on shared compensation, and that the interaction effects 
between the shared  compensation variables and forms of  information 
sharing, communication, and consultation between managers are by and 
large insignificant in this data set and so appear not to contribute to higher 
productivity.  I ' 
Table 3.4 further investigates the association between productivity and 
shared-compensation  arrangements by  differentiating  the effect of  our 
four Compensation schemes between the type of employee covered by each 
scheme: managerial employees in column (1) and nonmanagerial employ- 
ees in column (2). This distinction is motivated by the notion that company 
share option schemes ought to have a much greater effect among manage- 
rial employees, while approved profit-sharing schemes might have a more 
evenhanded impact. In addition, the data tell us the percentage of mana- 
gerial employees and of nonmanagerial employees covered by each com- 
pensation arrangement. This contrasts with the 0-1 dummy variable for the 
presence of shared-compensation arrangements used in table 3.3.12 Pre- 
sumably, the more-refined percentage of employees covered by a scheme 
gives us a better indicator of the potential incentive effect of the scheme 
than the simple measure of the presence or absence of the scheme. The ev- 
idence in table 3.4 shows a positive, although not statistically significant, 
relation between share options and productivity for managers but no such 
relation for nonmanagers. By contrast, the estimates show a larger impact 
of approved  profit-sharing schemes on productivity for nonmanagerial 
workers than for managerial workers. The different proportions of man- 
agers and nonmanagers covered by  the schemes make it hard to reach a 
sharp conclusion, however, since the results may be partly driven by those 
proportions rather than any differences in behavior. 
3.4.1  Stock Market Evidence 
A different way to examine the effect of shared compensation on the per- 
formance of listed firms is to compare the development of the stock price 
of firms with shared compensation to the stock prices of other firms. If 
10. The equation is log(Q,,) = at + p, In(L,,) + pz  In(K,,) + &(Union,,) + P,(Competi- 
tion,,) + @,(Share  CompensationK,,) + &(Information Sharing) + &(Information Sharing X 
Share CompensationKl,) + p,(Year Dummies) + e,,. 
11. Recall that the information-sharing variable is made up of three other variables (see 
tables 3.3 and 3.4). These component variables were tried separately to see whether this al- 
tered the results. They did not. 
12. Where a company does not have a scheme the variable is coded zero. 126  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 3.4  Firm-Level Productivity Regressions: Management and Nonmanagement 
Participation in Shared-Compensation  Schemes 
Only Managerial  Only Nonmanagerial 
Employees  Employees 
Are Covered  Are Covered 
(1)  (2) 
log(emp1oyment)  0.7015***  0.7039*** 
(0.0886)  (0.0905) 
log(capita1)  0.1891***  0.1937*** 
(0.0491)  (0.048  8) 
Union  -0.0333  -0.0404 
(0.0517)  (0.0564) 
Competition  -0.0306  0.0310 
(0.1241)  (0.0970) 
Employees participating  (%I) 
Approved profit-sharing scheme  0.1128***  0.1975*** 
(0.0625)  (0.0693) 
Approved profit-related pay scheme  -0.0464  -0.0643 * * 
(0.0382)  (0.0364) 
Approved all employee share option  -0.0066  -0.0159 
scheme SAYE  (0.0701)  (0.0833) 
Approved company share option scheme  0.1065  -0.0356 
(0.0913)  (0.0931) 
No. of observations  932  932 
Firms  282  282 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes  YCS 
Time period  1995-1 998  1995-1 998 
Adjusted R’  0.9823  0.9823 
Notes: Shared-compensation arrangement is measurcd as proportion of employees of given 
type participating in scheme. Dependent variable is log of total output. Robust standard er- 
rors reported in parentheses. All regressions contain an unreported arbitrary constant. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
firms with shared compensation make investments that raise sales in the fu- 
ture and thus raise the value of the firm, this could show up in the growth 
of their stock prices but not in current productivity figures.I3  Accordingly, 
we examined the association between stock prices and the extent of shared 
compensation. A London firm, Capital Strategies, produces an Employee 
Ownership Index (EOI) of the share prices of firms that have a “significant 
degree of employee share ownership,” which it then compares to general 
movements in the London stock market. Figure 3.1 shows that the EOI 
13. In equilibrium, the impact should be on price-earnings ratios, but in a period of in- 
creased use of shared compensation, such as the 1990s, it would be reflected in the growth of 
share prices. Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  127 
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Fig. 3.1 
versus the FTSE All-Share Index 
Source: Capital Strategies (@ttp://www.esop.co,uk/press/2 1080O.htm]). 
Stock returns 1992-2000  companies with all-employee share plans 
outperformed the all-share index in the 1990s.  An investment of El00 in the 
EOI in 1992 would be worth &667,  while the same investment in the FTSE 
Group All-Share Index would be worth E244 (see http://www.esop.co.uk/ 
press/210800.htm). Using our database of 299 listed firms, we  identified 
companies that used approved profit sharing or all-employee share schemes 
and created an index of their share prices from 1991 to 1999. Figure 3.2 
shows that &lo0  invested in the portfolio of companies that use share-based 
compensation plans grew to E350. However, the same El00 invested in the 
FTSE All-Share Index in 1990 is worth about E250 in 1999. 
Since neither the Capital Strategies index nor our index controls for risk 
factors or for the concentration of these firms in particular sectors, it is 
possible that a more refined analysis might find that these (or other) factors 
explain the observed results. The consistency with our productivity results, 
however, lends weight to the overall conclusion that shared capitalism pays 
off  for firms. To  explore this issue further, we  estimated stock returns 
equations  similar  to those advocated by Wadhwani and Wall (  1990).14 
We regressed the estimated annual return to owning the firms' shares on 
a dummy variable that is equal to  1 whenever the shared-compensation 
14. The stock return for a company was defined as the annual change in the company-return 
index to the 31 December end of the year. The return index was derived from Datastream item 
RI and captures capital appreciation and dividends reinvested on a continuous basis. The 









I -  FTSE All Share  all  Employec I 
Fig. 3.2 
versus the FTSE All-Share Index 
Source: Datastream International, 
Note: Stock returns calculated as the daily change in company market value. 
Stock returns 1990-1999: companies with all-employee share plans 
scheme is in effect and a set of covariates to control for other factors that 
will affect the stock price: the return on the FTSE All-Share Index and in- 
dustry dummies; year and industry dummies; year, industry, and industry 
X year interaction variables; and finally year and firm dummy variables. 
Although this analysis falls short of a typical event study,I5  because we only 
observe whether there is a scheme in place in a particular year, not the ex- 
act day the firm announced the adoption of the scheme, it should still cast 
some light onto the impact of the schemes on share prices. 
Table 3.5 gives the results of our analysis. Column (1) records the regres- 
sion coefficients on the four compensation  variables with the aggregate 
market return  and industry dummy variables as covariates. Column (2) 
records the regression coefficients on the four compensation variables, with 
the industry dummy variables and year dummies as covariates. Column (3) 
records the regression coefficients on the four compensation variables, with 
year dummies, industry dummies, and industry and year dummy interac- 
tions. In all of these calculations there is a statistically significant positive 
association  between  stock returns and two  of the shared compensation 
variables: the all-employee profit-sharing  scheme and the SAYE scheme. 
The positive effect of the all-employee profit-sharing  scheme on stock re- 
turns mirrors the positive relation between all-employee profit sharing and 
productivity in our firm productivity regressions. But we do not find a pos- 
15. In an event study, one compares the stock price immediately after an announcement of 
economically important information with the price immediately before the information be- 
came known. Shared Modes of Compensation and  Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  129 
Table 3.5  Firm-Level Stock Returns and Shared-Compensation Practices, 
1995-1998 
Firms’ Annual Stock Returns 
(1) 
Approved profit-sharing scheme  0.0910*** 
(0.0314) 
Approved profit-related pay scheme  0.0223 
(0.0293) 
Approved all-employee share option  0.0749*** 
scheme SAYE  (0.0299) 
Approved company share option  0.0204 
scheme  (0.0312) 
Return on FTSE All-Share Index 
Year dummies 
Industry dummies 
Industry X year dummies 
Firm fixed effects 




























































Notes; Dependent variable is firm shareholder return (defined as the annual percentage 
change in the Datastream return index for each company). Robust standard errors reported 
in parentheses. Compensation scheme variables are dummy variables equal to 1 ifa scheme is 
in effect, 0 otherwise. All regressions estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
itive link between the approved company share option plan and the share 
price, perhaps because the option plan distributes some of the benefits of 
better performance to workers rather than to shareholders. 
Column (4) of the table provides a stronger test of the effect of the in- 
troduction of the shared-compensation schemes on share prices. Here we 
regress the annual stock return on dummy variables for each firm and for 
the year. This effectively compares share prices of the same firm when it has 
a particular  scheme in place and when it does not. All of the shared- 
compensation variables obtain positive coefficients in this regression, but 
only  the  approved  profit-sharing  scheme  has  an estimated  coefficient 
greater than its standard error. We conclude that when a firm introduces an 
approved profit-sharing scheme its stock performs modestly better, but that 
much of the positive relation between share prices and shared compensa- 
tion is due to unobserved firm characteristics that yield high firm returns. 
3.4.2  Shared Compensation and Information and 
Decision Making: Firm-Level Effects 
An important prediction from the theory of shared compensation is that 
there should be a complementarity between shared-compensation prac- 130  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
tices and the allocation of decision-making rights and information sharing 
with workers. To get at this issue we used questions from our firm-level sur- 
vey that relate to consultation, communication, and information sharing. 
In particular, the survey asked firms to indicate whether they had “a joint 
committee of managers and employees primarily concerned with consufta- 
tion rather than negotiation”; “a formal structure for information sharing 
with employees (e.g., provision of data on financial status, production and 
labor market position, and market strategy)”; and, finally, “a formal struc- 
ture for communication between all levels of employees and management 
(e.g., quality circles, newsletters, and suggestion schemes).” In addition, we 
created an aggregate variable that represents the presence of any of these 
forms of information or decision.16 
To  see whether  these forms of information  and decision making are 
more likely in firms with shared-compensation modes of pay, we regressed 
the dichotomous variables indicating the presence  of these four forms 
of  information  and decision  sharing  on  the  presence  of  the  shared- 
compensation schemes in place at listed U.K. firms. We estimated simple 
probit models on the pooled data over the whole sample period. In addi- 
tion to the experimental shared-compensation variables, we also included 
two other measures of pay practices. Specifically, firms were asked to in- 
dicate the existence of “team-based performance-related pay (related to 
the achievement  of  team  objectives)” and the existence of  “individual 
performance-related pay (merit pay or bonuses determined by agreed in- 
dividual objectives).” 
The results contained in table 3.6 report the marginal effects from the 
probit estimation. They show, as expected, a generally positive correlation 
between information sharing and decision rights and the use by firms of 
shared-compensation structures.  l7 The general pattern of results, there- 
fore, seems to fit with the prediction from incentive theory. Team-based 
pay increases the likelihood of firms’ using consultation, information shar- 
ing, and communications systems. They are always positively correlated. 
Moreover, the incidence of some shared-compensation systems increases 
the likelihood of firms’ adopting particular information-sharing and deci- 
sion-making environments. For instance, approved profit sharing is gener- 
ally positively related to consultation and communication systems but not 
to information sharing. Approved SAY E schemes increase the likelihood 
of all forms of information sharing and decision making. However, there 
is generally no relation between approved company share option plans 
16. These questions  are based upon and hence similar to the WIRS and WERS  questions. 
See the establishment-level results that follow. The descriptive statistics for the firm-level 
questions are contained in table 3A.  1, 
17. We experimented with other estimation methods. For instance, a random-effects logit 
model yielded qualitative results similar to those presented in the paper. Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  131 
Table 3.6  Relationship  between Shared Compensation, Communication, and Consultation: 
Firm-Level Estimates 
Dependent Variables 
Joint  Any 
Consultation  Information  Communication  Consultation or 
Committees  Sharing  Structure  Communication 
Approved profit sharing 
Approved profit-related pay 
Approved SAYE (YN) 
(YN) 
(YN) 
Approved company share 
option plan (YN) 
Team-based pay (YN) 
Individual performance- 
related pay (YN) 
log (real sales) 
log (total employees) 
Union recognized in 
workplace (YN) 
Industry (YN)” 
Year dummies (YN) 
Constant 






















































































Source: Authors’ survey. 
Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. Y = yes; N = no. Checks indi- 
cate that variable is included. 
dl-digit  SE dummies. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
and information  sharing (except the negative impact observed for joint- 
consultation committees). Finally, we find little evidence of a relationship 
between approved profit-related pay schemes and decentralized decision 
making. This is consistent with the notion that many firms used this to get 
tax advantages without really linking pay to profits. We reconsider these is- 
sues using the establishment-level data in the following section. 
3.5  Production Function Evidence: Establishment-Level  Results 
The  WERS survey asks managers to rate the performance of their work- 
place relative to their industry on the basis of financial performance and 132  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
labor productivity.IX  The rating is on a five-point scale, according to which 
many more managers rate their establishment as better than average rather 
than below average. We analyze these data using an ordered probit anal- 
ysis, with the outcomes ordered so that positive coefficients imply better 
outcomes. Our cross-sectional analysis links financial performance and 
productivity of each establishment to measures of shared compensation 
that arc conditional on the number of employees, age of establishment, 
one-digit industry, and distribution of the workforce by skill and gender, 
along with dummy variables for the degree of competition in the sector. 
Table 3.7 presents the results for the 1998 WERS cross section. In these 
calculations we use two different measures of shared compensation as in- 
dependent variables: a 0/1 absence/presence measure of particular types of 
shared compensation and, in separate calculations, a continuous measure 
of the percentage of nonexecutive workers covered by the schemes. We ex- 
amine the effects of each program and also examine the effect of a simple 
aggregate measure of all the programs within an establishment. Regardless 
of the particular measure, the results show a positive relationship between 
shared compensation and economic performance. 
Consider first the results for financial performance. The calculations for 
the separate programs show that each of the measures of shared compen- 
sation is positively related to the financial performance of the firm. The 
largest and most significant coefficients are for employee share ownership 
and profit-related pay; the smallest and least significant coefficient is for 
deferred profit share. We are dubious  about the interpretation of the profit- 
related pay variable, since firms that have profits are more likely to use 
profit-related pay, but there is no comparable reverse causality problem in 
the  linkage  between  other  shared-compensation  schemes and perfor- 
mance. In the summary columns we report results when we aggregate the 
four shared compensation systems into a single “summated rating” (Bar- 
tholomew 1996). The summated rating simply adds together the 0/1 vari- 
ables to obtain an index from 0 to 4, depending upon how many forms of 
shared compensation the firm used. In the calculation  the coefficient is 
positive and over four times its standard error, indicating that, broadly 
speaking, establishments with  shared compensation have better perfor- 
mance. The next columns repeat these calculations with the proportion of 
workers covered by each system (or the summation thereof) as the inde- 
pendent variables. They give modestly stronger results to those with the 
presence of program measures. 
The calculations for labor productivity show that employee share own- 
ership and profit-related pay are significantly positively linked to produc- 
18. We have also examined the eKect of shared  compensation on two other variables-qual- 
ity of goods or services and changes in productivity over the previous five years--and  found 
weaker positive effects for the impact of shared compensation on quality and stronger effects 
for its impact on changes in productivity than the effects shown in the exhibit. Table 3.7  Ordered Probit Estimates of the Link between Shared Compensation and Financial Performance and Labor Productivity 
Financial Performance (5-point scale)  Labor Productivity (5-point scale) 
Presence (YN)  Coverage (“h)  Presence (YN)  Coverage (YO) 
Separate  Summary  Separate  Summary  Separate  Summary  Separate  Summary 
Profit-related pay (YN) 
Deferred profit sharing (YN) 
Employee share ownership (YN) 
Any group performance-related pay (YN) 
Number of group variable pay schemes 
Sum Y’n  eligible for group variable pay 
Individual performance-related pay only (YN) 























0.07  0.10 
(0.12)  (0.19) 
-0.12  -0.14 











0.12  0.07 
(0.19)  (0.12) 
-0.13  -0.06 













0.09  0.31  0.32 
-0.05  -0.06  -0.05 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
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tivity,  while  deferred  profit-sharing  schemes  and group  performance- 
related pay are not. Again, the summated rating measure of  programs 
yields a positive, highly significant coefficient. In the last two columns, 
which use the proportion of nonmanagerial workers covered by the schemes 
as the independent variables, we obtain comparable results, with employee 
share ownership and profit-related pay most strongly related to productiv- 
ity among the individual programs. The summated rating statistic has the 
same strong impact on labor productivity that it did on financial perfor- 
mance. 
In addition to the shared-compensation variables, we included two other 
human resource-related  measures: whether or not the firm has some form 
of individual performance-related pay and no group performance pay (i.e,, 
piece rates or commissions), and union recognition. The individual pay 
measures are weakly positively related to financial performance and pro- 
ductivity, while unionism is negatively related to financial performance and 
obtains an insignificant negative coefficient in the productivity eq~ati0n.l~ 
Finally, table 3.8  considers two other outcome measures: the quality of 
product and services and changes in labor productivity. The relationship 
between the experimental shared-compensation variables and changes in 
labor productivity are qualitatively similar to those established so far- 
namely, a positive relationship between shared compensation and eco- 
nomic performance (in this case, productivity growth). On the other hand, 
we are unable to identify a relationship between the shared-compensation 
system and the quality of products and service produced. 
3.5.1  Shared Compensation and Information, and 
Decision Making: Establishment Effects 
As noted, a key prediction of the theory of shared compensation is that 
establishments with shared-compensation practices should also share in- 
formation and decision making with workers. The 1998 WERS contains a 
module on consultation and communication that allows us to examine this 
prediction at the establishment level. Specifically, the WERS asks man- 
agers whether their workplace has “a system of briefings for any section or 
sections of the workforce”; “committees of managers and employees . . . 
primarily concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation”; “groups 
at this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of perfor- 
mance or quality . . . sometimes known as quality circles”; and “consulta- 
tive committees of managers and employees in your organization that op- 
erates at a higher level than this establishment.” 
To  see whether  these forms of information  and decision making are 
more likely in firms with shared-compensation modes of pay, we regressed 
19. Metcalf finds that this effect occurs exclusively in establishments where competition is 
low, which suggests that unions are redistributing rents. Profit-related pay (YN)  0.08 
(0.06) 
Deferred profit sharing (YN)  -0.04 
(0.10) 
Employee share ownership (YN)  0.07 
(0.07) 
Any group performance-related pay (YN)  0.06 
(0.07) 
Number of group variable pay schemes  0.c 
Table 3.8  Ordered Probit Estimates of the Link between Shared Compensation  and Quality of Product and Services and Changes in Labor Productivity 
Quality of Product and Services (5-point scale)  Changes in Labor Productivity (5-point scale) 
Presence (YN)  Coverage (Yo)  Presence (YN)  Coverage (YO) 









(0.03)  (0.03) 
Sum  %I  eligible for group variable pay  0.10  0.22 
Individual performance-related  pay only (YN)  -0.19  -0.19  -0.13  -0.12  0.29  0.24  0.23  0.21 
Union recognized in workplace (YN)  -0.26  -0.26  -0.26  -0.27  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.20 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
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0/1 variables for the presence of these four forms of information and deci- 
sion  sharing  on the absence  or presence  of  the shared-compensation 
schemes for nonmanagerial workers at the establishment. For simplicity, 
we used a linear probability regression format for these computations. The 
results in table 3.9 show the expected complementarity, with share owner- 
ship and (the relatively rare) deferred profit-sharing having the most sub- 
stantial  link  to the various  forms of communication  and consultation. 
Once again, profit-related pay shows the weakest link to the various com- 
munication and consultation  groups-indeed,  it is negatively related to 
joint consultation  committees  and substantially  related  to higher-level 
committees. The pattern fits broadly, moreover, with what we might rea- 
sonably expect from incentive theory. Group-related pay is linked to brief- 
Table 3.9  Regression Estimates of the Relationship  between Shared Compensation  for 
Nonmanagerial Employees and Communication and Consultation 
Dependent Variables 
Joint  High-Level 
Consultation  Quality  Joint Consultation 
Briefings  Committees  Circles  Committees 
Profit-related pay (YN) 
Deferred profit sharing (YN) 
Employee share owncrship (YN) 
Any group performance-related 
Individual performance-related 
Union recognized in workplace 
Age of establishment (years) 
Number of employees (N) 
Women in the workplace (“h) 
Skilled-3  levels (%) 
Industry-ll  levels (YN) 
Competition-5  levels (YN) 
Constant 
Pay (YN) 
pay only (YN) 
(YN) 
No. of observations 
R2 
Adjusted R’ 

































































































Source: WERS 1998 (available at [http://www.dti.gov.uk/cr/emar/l998wers.htm]). 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Y = yes; N = no. Checks indicate that the variable is included. Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  139 
ings, consultation committees, and quality circles, but not to higher-level 
committees, while employee ownership and deferred profit sharing are rel- 
atively strongly related to higher-level committees, as well as to the lower- 
level forms of communication and consultation. But the strongest single 
variable that increases the probability of communication and consultation 
is the recognition of a union at the workplace (see Gregg and Machin 1988). 
In addition, following the same procedures that we used for analyzing 
our firm-based data set, we examined whether the existence of consultation 
and communication channels affected the link between shared compensa- 
tion and outcomes. We found no evidence that it did and no evidence that 
the presence  of  both shared  compensation and more  communication 
raised productivity more than did the separate impact of each.2o 
3.5.2  Longitudinal Analyses 
The cross-relation patterns in the WERS in tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 are 
consistent with the notion that shared-compensation systems have benefi- 
cial economic effects and are associated with greater communication and 
consultation with employees. But they leave the door open to alternative 
interpretations of the positive relationships. One interpretation is that the 
data reflect unobserved differences among  firms: “Good firms” use shared 
compensation systems, consult or communicate more with employees, and 
have higher productivity. To examine the unobservable good-firm effect, 
we use a fixed effects longitudinal analysis that compares the same firm be- 
fore and after a given change in shared-compensation modes of pay. As 
noted earlier, fixed effects models do not resolve all questions about causal- 
ity in nonexperimental data-in  particular, there are issues relating to the 
endogeneity of policy-but  they do take us one step closer to the ideal ex- 
perimental design, particularly if changes in policies reflect factors that are 
themselves uncorrelated with ensuing performance. 
The WERS files permit  two types  of  before-and-after comparisons. 
First, the 1998 WERS “change in the workplace” module asked managers 
about changes in the past five years (1993-1998)  in the establishment’s la- 
bor practices and economic outcomes, including, which is critical to us, 
whether the firm increased or decreased (by a lot or a little) the proportion 
of nonmanual workers covered by variable pay or instead kept the propor- 
tion constant. By  relating changes in the proportion of workers covered by 
variable pay to changes in other key economic measures-such  as infor- 
mation provided to workers, employee decision making, and productiv- 
ity--we  have a fixed effects analysis, albeit one based on questions of a 
retrospective nature. 
20. We entered the consultation and communication variables into the ordered probit cal- 
culations in table 3.6 and found they did not affect the results substantively; nor did various 
forms of interaction between composites of the variables and shared-compensation variables. 140  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 3.10 shows the link between the change in variable pay, which is 
given in the rows, and changes in other variables, given in the columns. The 
first panel shows that firms that increased the proportion of workers re- 
ceiving variable pay also increased information flows to employees, while 
firms that decreased variable pay disproportionately reduced the informa- 
tion provided. The second panel shows that changes in variable pay and 
changes in employees' influence over their job also moved in the same di- 
rection, while the third and fourth panels show the relation for employee 
Table 3.10  Change in the Proportion of Variable Pay for NonmdWdgerial Workers 
by Changes in Workplace Activities over a Five-Year Period, 
1993-1998  (Yo) 
Change in Proportion 
of Variable Pay for 
Nonmanagerial Employees  Up a Lot  Up  a Little  No Change  Gone Down  Total 
Change in Information Provided to Employees by Employers 
Up a lot  67.8  24.6  6.2  I .4 
Up a little  53.1  30.7  16.0  .2 
No change  41.3  37.6  19.9  1.3 
Gone down  36.7  38.8  22.4  2.0 
Total  47.0  34.5  17.5  1  .o 
Change in Employoes' Influence over Job by Employers 
Up a lot  31.3  50.2  17.1  1.4 
Up a little  21.3  48.8  28.1  1.7 
No change  12.6  44.2  38.4  4.8 
Gone down  18.4  36.7  36.7  8.2 
Total  16.9  45.8  33.5  3.8 
Change in How Hard People Work by Employers 
Up a lot  55.0  33.2  10.9  .9 
Up a little  43.7  42.4  12.2  1.7 
No change  39.8  37.3  21.3  1.6 
Gone down  39.6  29.2  22.9  8.3 
Total  42.4  37.9  18.0  1.7 
Change in Employee Influence over Managerial Decision Making by Employers 
Up a lot  20.9  48.3  28.9  1.9 
Up a little  10.2  49.7  37.7  2.3 
No change  7.6  39.6  50.5  2.3 
Gone down  8.0  24.0  52.0  16.0 
Total  9.7  42.6  45.0  2.6 
Change in Labor Productivity by Employers 
Up a lot  62.1  28.2  5.8  3.9 
Up a little  47.1  39.1  9.7  4.1 
No change  40.4  38.4  17.1  4.2 
Gone down  37.5  31.3  18.8  12.5 
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influence over managerial decision making and “how hard people work.” 
In  all of these  cases, changes in variable pay  are positively related  to 
changes in employee involvement in the workplace, and this is impressive 
and supportive of the incentive-based model of shared-compensation sys- 
tems that we sketched out earlier. 
Regarding our bottom-line measure of the effect of shared compensa- 
tion-labor  productivity-the  last panel records the link between changes 
in variable pay and changes in labor productivity. This can be viewed as a 
longitudinal test of the cross-sectional productivity calculations in tables 
3.7 and 3.8.  The results are striking. Sixty-two percent of managers in firms 
that increased variable pay a lot reported that productivity went up a lot, 
compared to much lower proportions of managers in firms where variable 
pay increased only a little, didn’t change, or went down. At the other end 
of the spectrum, proportionately fewer managers in firms that increased 
variable pay a lot reported worsened productivity performance than did 
managers in firms with other changes in the proportion of workers covered 
by variable pay. 
3.5.3  Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1990-1998  Panel 
The WERS panel data identify establishments that changed their system 
of shared-compensation between 1990 and 1998. Some establishments in 
the panel  survey added nonexecutive  stock ownership plans  or profit- 
sharing plans, while a small number withdrew such plans. If these forms of 
shared compensation in fact contribute to financial performance or labor 
productivity, we would expect to see that proportionately more managers 
in establishments adopting plans would see an improvement in outcomes 
than in other establishments and that the converse would hold for man- 
agers in establishments discarding such plans. However, given that estab- 
lishments that changed their policies in any direction presumably did so in 
the expectation of improving outcomes, the endogeneity of the choice to 
change plans presumably operates against our finding such an effect. Table 
3.1  1 compares the results  for establishments that changed their profit- 
sharing or nonexecutive ownership schemes between the 1990 and 1998 
WERS surveys. It records the number that changed their programs ac- 
cording to their financial performance  or labor productivity in the two 
years. The number of firms covered is smaller than the number of changers 
given in the 1998 WERS panel because we deleted observations for estab- 
lishments that did not respond to the 1990 survey question about profit 
sharing  or  ownership even  though  the  1998 WERS panel  reported  a 
change from 1990. We were not sure this was an accurate change. 
As a crude summary of the direction of change in productivity and 
financial performance, we have coded the responses to these questions ac- 
cording to a simple numeric scheme. We give a 0 to establishments that re- 
ported doing about average; 1 to those that did somewhat above average; 2 142  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 3.11  Number of Establishments  with Varying Levels of Financial Performance and Labor 
Productivity in 1990 and 1997, by Change in Shared-Compensation  Systems, 
1990-1997 
Profit Sharing  Nonexecutive Share Ownership 
Added  Removed  Added  Removed 
1990  1997  1990  1997  1990  1997  1990  1997 
Financial performance 
relative to average 








Difference in difference 
Labor productivity relative 
to average 









































2  0 
1  1 
7  12 
9  6 
4  4 
23  23 
.52  .57 
.05 
0  0 
0  0 
8  15 
16  6 
5  8 
29  29 
































2  I 
3  3 
9  11 
8  9 
8  6 
30  30 
.57  .53 
.04 
-.04 
1  2 
2  4 
18  11 
9  13 
5  5 
35  35 
.43  .43 
.oo 
.10 
Source: Calculated from 1990-1998  WERS panel, with average scores based on assigning 0 to average, 
1 to above average, 2 to a lot above average, -1  to below average, and -2  to a lot below average. 
to those that did a lot above average; and -1  and -2  for the corresponding 
groups that did somewhat and a lot below average, respectively. We then 
calculated the score for each group. For instance, the number 0.57 in the 
1990 column under profit sharing added means that the eighty-six estab- 
lishments that added a profit-sharing system had a financial performance 
that was modestly above average in 1990. Because managers tend to over- 
report their performance, this performance is, in fact, about average. The 
number 0.79 in the 1997 column shows that establishments that added 
profit sharing had that score for their financial performance in 1997. The 
change from 1990 to 1997 was 0.22, so establishments that added a profit- 
sharing  scheme improved  their financial  performance  by  that  amount 
on our scale. Similarly, we calculated the change in performance for the Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  143 
twenty-three establishments that removed a profit-sharing scheme in the 
period. This is 0.05. The difference-in-difference calculation for the estab- 
lishments is obtained by comparing the change in the summary statistic for 
establishments that added a program and the change in the summary sta- 
tistic for establishments that removed the program. Positive differences in 
differences imply that the shared-compensation system improved an out- 
come, while negative differences imply that it made matters worse. In our 
case, this is 0.17, which means that firms that added profit sharing im- 
proved their performance relative to firms that reduced profit sharing. 
The results in table 3.1  1 show that, in three of the four of the compar- 
isons, the differences in differences are positive, implying that, with this 
simple scale, firms that introduced programs had improved performance 
relative to firms that removed programs. The small samples, however, make 
this at best a suggestive result. 
3.6  Conclusions 
The use of shared compensation arrangements by companies increased 
considerably in the 1990s, with the biggest growth occurring among em- 
ployee ownership schemes. Our firm-level survey indicates that companies 
were more likely to use profit-sharing schemes, SAYE schemes, and com- 
pany  share option plans in  1998 than in  1995. Our establishment-level 
panel data showed an increase in the proportion of establishments with 
profit sharing and with nonexecutive ownership schemes. 
In part, the growth of shared compensation can be attributed to gov- 
ernment  policies  that introduced  tax  incentives  to  encourage  shared- 
compensation systems in an attempt to enhance corporate productivity. In 
this respect, the policies of the United Kingdom to encourage shared com- 
pensation differ noticeably from those of the United States. The United 
Kingdom encourages individual ownership, while the United States en- 
courages collective ownership through ESOPs. The market, rather than the 
state, has spurred the growth of options and individual share ownership in 
the United States. 
Shared capitalist modes of pay should improve the economy in two ways. 
They  should  increase  communication  and consultation  with  workers, 
which spurs economic democracy. Our evidence shows that shared com- 
pensation is indeed linked to various forms of communication and consul- 
tation. They also should ideally induce employees to think and act like 
owners, making decisions that  increase corporate value. Our evidence 
shows that shared-compensation systems in the United Kingdom are pos- 
itively associated with productivity, although, as in other studies, we find 
that the effect of the systems varies across data sets and measures of out- 
comes. 144  Martin J. Conyon and Richard B. Freeman 
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Appendix 
Table 3A.1  Descriptive Statistics on the Firm-Level Data 
Year 
Variable  1995  1996  1997  1998 
log(rea1  output) 
log(emp1oyment) 
log(capita1) 
Trade unions or staff associations recognized 
by management for negotiating pay and 
conditions 
Competition (greater than five product-market 
competitors) 
Information sharing (which is an indicator 
variable if the firm has any one of the 








































Source: Based on a sample of 299 U.K. stock market firms surveyed in 1999 
Note; Actual numbers of firms per cell may differ 
aA  joint committee of managers and employees primarily concerned with consultation rather 
than negotiation. 
bA  formal structure for information sharing with employees (e.g., position of data on finan- 
cial status, production and labor-market position, and market strategy. 
‘A  formal structure for communication between all levels of employees and management 
(e.g., quality circlcs, newslettcrs, and suggcstion schemes). Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: U.K. Evidence  145 
Table 3A.2  Firm-Level Productivity  Regressions  (fixed effects): The Impact of 






Approved profit-sharing scheme 
Approved profit-sharing scheme 
X information sharing 
Approved profit-related pay 
scheme 
Approved profit-related pay 
scheme X information sharing 
Approved all-employee share 
option scheme SAYE 
Approved all-employee share 
option scheme SAYE X 
information sharing 
Approved company share option 
scheme 
Approved company share option 
scheme X information sharing 






























































0.7028***  0.7016*** 
(0.0855)  (0.0834) 
0.1785***  0.1783*** 
(0.0462)  (0.0484) 
(0.0454)  (0.0503) 
-0.0059  0.0384 
(0.1077)  (0.1277) 
0.0046  0.0034 












-0.0346  -0.0378 
-0.0540 
0.2278***  0.2182*** 
(0.1140)  (0.1188) 
(0.1143)  (0.1214) 
-0.1512  -0.1495 
936  936 
283  283 
Yes  Yes 
0.9825  0.9826 
1995-1998  1995- 1998 
Notes: Interaction effects between information sharing included. Dependent variable in each column is 
log of total output. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1  percent level. 
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